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Abstract
This paper examines the problem of repeatedly implementing an efficient social
choice function when the agents’ preferences evolve randomly. We show that the
freedom to set different mechanisms at different histories can give the planner an ad-
ditional leverage to deter undesirable behavior even if the mechanisms are restricted
to be simple and finite. Specifically, we construct a history-dependent sequence of
simple mechanisms such that, with minor qualifications, every pure subgame per-
fect equilibrium delivers the correct social choice at every history, while every mixed
equilibrium is strictly Pareto-dominated. More importantly, when faced with agents
with a preference for less complex strategies at the margin, the (efficient) social
choice function can be repeatedly implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium in
pure or mixed strategies. Our results demonstrate a positive role for complexity
considerations in mechanism design.
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1 Introduction
The success of a society often hinges on the design of its institutions, from markets to
voting. From a game-theoretic perspective, the basic requirement of an institution is
that it admits an equilibrium satisfying properties that the society deems desirable, as
forwarded by the literature on mechanism design. A more satisfactory way of designing an
institution is to have all of its equilibria to be desirable, or to achieve full implementation.
In a recent paper, Lee and Sabourian [21] (henceforth, LS) extend the scope of im-
plementation to infinitely repeated environments in which the agents’ preferences evolve
stochastically, and demonstrate a fundamental difference between the problems of one-
shot and repeated implementation. In particular, they establish, with minor qualifica-
tions, that in complete information environments a social choice function is repeatedly
implementable in Nash equilibrium if and only if it is efficient, thereby dispensing with
Maskin monotonicity [25] that occupies the critical position in one-shot implementation
and yet often amounts to a very restrictive requirement, incompatible with many desirable
normative properties including efficiency (e.g. Mueller and Satterthwaite [34], Saijo [36]).
The notion of efficiency represents the basic goal of an economic system and therefore the
sufficiency results in LS offer strong implications.
Despite the appeal of its results, the full implementation approach has often been
criticized for employing abstract institutions that neither square up to the demands of real
world mechanism design, nor are theoretically appealing. The implementation literature
has therefore engaged in multiple debates as to whether it can maintain the high standards
of its theoretical objective without exposing its key results to hinge on these issues (see, for
instance, the surveys of Moore [30], Jackson [16], Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m [26], and Serrano
[38]). The purpose of this paper is to bring the repeated analysis of LS to the realm of
these debates. We adopt a novel approach that appeals to bounded rationality of agents
and seek also to gain insights into a broader motivating enquiry: can a small departure
from fully rational behavior on the part of individuals work in the favor of the society to
broaden the scope of implementability? Specifically, we pursue the implications of agents
who have a preference for less complex strategies (at the margin) on the mechanism
designer’s ability to discourage undesired equilibrium outcomes.1
Many strong implementation results (including those of LS) have been obtained through
1The complexity cost in our analysis is concerned with implementation of a strategy. The players are
assumed to have full computational capacity to derive best responses.
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the usage of unbounded integer games which rule out certain undesired outcomes via an
infinite chain of dominated actions. One response in the implementation literature, both
in one-shot and repeated setups, to the criticism of its constructive arguments is that the
point of using abstract mechanisms is to demonstrate what can possibly be implemented
in most general environments; in specific situations, more appealing constructions may
also work. According to this view, the constructions allow us to show how tight the nec-
essary conditions for implementation are. Another response in the one-shot literature has
been to restrict attention to more realistic, finite mechanisms. However, using a finite
mechanism such as the modulo game to achieve Nash implementation brings an important
drawback: unwanted mixed strategy equilibria. This could be particularly problematic in
one-shot settings since, as Jackson [15] has shown, a finite mechanism that Nash imple-
ments a social choice function could invite unwanted mixed equilibria that strictly Pareto
dominate the desired outcomes.
In this paper, we apply our bounded rationality approach to the issue of implementing
efficient social choice functions in a repeated environment with only simple mechanisms.
In order to achieve implementation under changing preferences, a mechanism has to be
devised in each period to elicit the agents’ information. A key insight in LS is that the
mechanisms can themselves be made contingent on past histories in a way that, roughly
put, each agent’s individually rational equilibrium payoff at every history is equal to the
target payoff that he derives from implementation of the desired social choices. Part of
the arguments for this result involves an extension of the integer game.
Here, we show that it is possible to construct a sequence of simple and finite mecha-
nisms that has, under minor qualifications, the following equilibrium features:
• Every pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium repeatedly implements the efficient
social choice function, while every mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium is
strictly Pareto-dominated by the pure equilibria.
• Randomization can be eliminated altogether by making the sequence of mechanisms
non-stationary or history-dependent (different mechanisms are enforced at different
public histories) and by invoking an additional equilibrium refinement, based on a
“small” cost associated with implementing a more complex strategy.
Thus, even with simple finite mechanisms, the freedom to choose different mechanisms
at different histories enables the planner to design a sequence of mechanisms such that
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every pure equilibrium attains the desired outcomes; at the same time, if the players were
to randomize in equilibrium, the strategies would prescribe:
(i) inefficient outcomes, which therefore make non-pure equilibria in our repeated set-
tings less plausible from the efficiency perspective (as alluded to by Jackson [15]);
and, moreover,
(ii) a complex pattern of behavior (i.e., choosing different mixing probabilities at dif-
ferent histories) that could not be justified by payoff considerations, as simpler
strategies could induce the same payoff as the equilibrium strategy at every history.
We emphasize that, although the evolution of mechanisms follows a non-stationary
path, each mechanism that we employ has a simple two-stage sequential structure and a
finite number of actions that is independent of the number of players (unlike the modulo
game, for instance).
Our complexity refinement is particularly appealing and marginal for two reasons. On
the one hand, the notion of complexity needed to obtain the result stipulates only a partial
order over strategies such that stationary behavior (i.e., always making the same choice) is
simpler than taking different actions at different histories (any measure of complexity that
satisfies this will suffice). On the other hand, the equilibrium refinement requires players
to adopt minimally complex strategies among the set of strategies that are best responses
at every history. This is a significantly weaker refinement of equilibrium than the one
often adopted in the literature on complexity in dynamic games that asks strategies to be
minimally complex among those that are best responses only on the equilibrium path (see
Abreu and Rubinstein [2] and the survey of Chatterjee and Sabourian [6], among others).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe and discuss the problem
of repeated implementation. Section 3 presents our main analysis and results for the case
of two agents. The analysis for the case of three of more agents, appearing in Section 4,
builds on from the material on the two-agent case. Section 5 presents several extensions
of our results, and Section 6 offers a detailed discussion of how our work relates to the
existing implementation literature, including previous studies on bounded mechanisms
and mixed strategies in one-shot implementation. Section 7 concludes. Appendices and
a Supplementary Material are provided to present some proofs and additional results
omitted from the main text for expositional reasons.
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2 The Setup
The following describe the repeated implementation setup introduced by LS.
2.1 Basic Definitions and Notation
An implementation problem, P , is a collection P = [I, A,Θ, p, (ui)i∈I ] where I is a finite,
non-singleton set of agents (with some abuse of notation, I also denotes the cardinality
of this set), A is a finite set of outcomes, Θ is a finite, non-singleton set of the possible
states, p denotes a probability distribution defined on Θ such that p(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ
and agent i’s state-dependent utility function is given by ui : A×Θ→ R.
An SCF f in an implementation problem P is a mapping f : Θ → A, and the range
of f is the set f(Θ) = {a ∈ A : a = f(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ}. Let F denote the set of all
possible SCFs and, for any f ∈ F , define F (f) = {f ′ ∈ F : f ′(Θ) ⊆ f(Θ)} as the set of
all SCFs whose ranges belong to f(Θ).
For an outcome a ∈ A, define vi(a) =
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)ui(a, θ) as its (one-shot) expected
utility, or payoff, to agent i with v(a) = (vi(a))i∈I . Similarly, for an SCF f , define
vi(f) =
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)ui(f(θ), θ). Denoting the profile of payoffs associated with f by v(f) =
(vi(f))i∈I , let V =
{
v(f) ∈ RI : f ∈ F} be the set of expected utility profiles of all possible
SCFs. Also, for a given f ∈ F , let V (f) = {v(f ′) ∈ RI : f ′ ∈ F (f)} be the set of payoff
profiles of all SCFs whose ranges belong to the range of f . We refer to co(V ) and co(V (f))
as the convex hulls of the two sets, respectively.
LS define efficiency of an SCF in terms of the convex hull of the set of expected utility
profiles of all possible SCFs since this reflects the set of (discounted average) payoffs
that can be obtained in an infinitely repeated implementation problem. A payoff profile
v′ = (v′1, .., v
′
I) ∈ co(V ) is said to Pareto dominate another profile v = (v1, .., vI) if v′i ≥ vi
for all i with the inequality being strict for at least one agent; v′ strictly Pareto dominates
v if the inequality is strict for all i.
Definition 1 (a) An SCF f is efficient if there exists no v′ ∈ co(V ) that Pareto domi-
nates v(f); f is strictly efficient if it is efficient and there exists no f ′ ∈ F , f ′ 6= f ,
such that v(f ′) = v(f); f is strongly efficient if it is strictly efficient and v(f) is an
extreme point of co(V ).
(b) An SCF f is efficient in the range if there exists no v′ ∈ co(V (f)) that Pareto
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dominates v(f); f is strictly efficient in the range if it is efficient in the range and
there exists no f ′ ∈ F (f), f ′ 6= f , such that v(f ′) = v(f); f is strongly efficient
in the range if it is strictly efficient in the range and v(f) is an extreme point of
co(V (f)).
2.2 Repeated Implementation
We refer to P∞ as the infinite repetitions of the implementation problem P = [I, A,Θ, p, (ui)i∈I ].
Periods are indexed by t ∈ Z++ and the agents’ common discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1).
In each period, the state is drawn from Θ from an independent and identical probability
distribution p. For an (uncertain) infinite sequence of outcomes a∞ =
(
at,θ
)
t∈Z++,θ∈Θ,
where at,θ ∈ A is the outcome implemented in period t and state θ, agent i’s (repeated
game) payoff is given by
pii(a
∞) = (1− δ)
∑
t∈Z++
∑
θ∈Θ
δt−1p(θ)ui(at,θ, θ).
We assume that the structure of P∞ (including the discount factor) is common knowl-
edge among the agents and, if there is one, the planner. The realized state in each period
is complete information among the agents but unobservable to a third party.
Next, we define mechanisms and regimes. A (multi-stage) mechanism is defined as
g = ((M g(k))Kk=1, ψ), where K is the number of stages of the mechanism, M
g(k) =
M g1 (k) × · · · ×M gI (k) is a cross product of message spaces at stage k = 1, . . . , K, and,
letting M g ≡ M g(1) × · · · ×M g(K), ψg : M g → A is an outcome function such that
ψg(m) ∈ A for any K-stage history of message profiles m = (m1, . . . ,mK) ∈M g. We say
that mechanism g is finite if K is finite and |M gi (k)| < ∞ for every agent i and stage k.
Let G be the set of all feasible mechanisms.
A regime specifies history-dependent “transition rules” of mechanisms contingent on
the publicly observable history of mechanisms played and the agents’ corresponding ac-
tions. It is assumed that a planner, or the agents themselves, can commit to a regime at
the outset.
Given mechanism g, define Eg ≡ {(g,m)}m∈Mg , and let E = ∪g∈GEg. Then, H t =
E t−1 (the (t − 1)-fold Cartesian product of E) represents the set of all possible publicly
observable histories over t− 1 periods. The initial history is empty (trivial) and denoted
by H1 = ∅. Also, let H∞ = ∪∞t=1H t with a typical history denoted by h ∈ H∞.
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We define a regime, R, as a mapping R : H∞ → G.2 Let R|h refer to the continuation
regime that regime R induces at history h ∈ H∞ (thus, R|h(h′) = R(h, h′) for any
h, h′ ∈ H∞). We say that a regime R is history-independent if and only if, for any t and
any h, h′ ∈ H t, R(h) = R(h′), and that a regime R is stationary if and only if, for any
h, h′ ∈ H∞, R(h) = R(h′).
Given a regime, an agent can condition his actions on the past history of realized
states as well as that of mechanisms and message profiles played. Define Ht = (E ×Θ)t−1
as the (t− 1)-fold Cartesian product of the set E ×Θ, and let H1 = ∅ and H∞ = ∪∞t=1Ht
with its typical element denoted by h. Also, since we allow for mechanisms with multi-
stage sequential structure, we additionally describe information available within a period,
or partial history. For any K-stage mechanism g and for any 1 ≤ k ≤ K, let Dgk =
Θ×M g(1)× · · · ×M g(k− 1) denote the set of partial histories that can occur within the
first k−1 stages of g. Here, we take Dg1 = Θ; that is, the play of the first stage starts with
the arrival of a random state. Let Dg = ∪kDgk and D = ∪gDg with its typical element
denoted by d.
Then, we can write each agent i’s mixed (behavioral) strategy as a mapping σi :
H∞ × G × D → ∪g,kMgi (k) such that σi(h, g, d) ∈ Mgi (k) for any h ∈ H∞, g ∈ G and
d ∈ Dgk. Let Σi be the set of all such strategies, and let Σ ≡ Σ1 × · · · × ΣI . A strategy
profile is denoted by σ ∈ Σ. We say that σi is a Markov (history-independent) strategy
if and only if σi(h, g, d) = σi(h
′, g, d) for any h,h′ ∈ H∞, g ∈ G and d ∈ D. A strategy
profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σI) is Markov if and only if σi is Markov for each i.
Suppose that R is the regime and σ the strategy profile chosen by the agents. Then,
for any date t and history h ∈ Ht, we define the following:
• gh(σ,R) ≡ (Mh(σ,R), ψh(σ,R)) refers to the mechanism played at h.
• pihi (σ,R), with slight abuse of notation, denotes agent i’s expected continuation
payoff at h. For notational simplicity, let pii(σ,R) ≡ pihi (σ,R) for h ∈ H1.
• Ah,θ(σ,R) ⊂ A denotes the set of outcomes implemented with positive probability
at h when the current state is θ.
When the meaning is clear, we shall sometimes suppress the arguments in the above
variables and refer to them simply as gh, pihi and A
h,θ.
2Therefore, we restrict attention to deterministic transitions of mechanisms. We below discuss how
our constructive arguments can be made simpler if one allows for random transitions.
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Let S-equilibrium be a game theoretic solution concept, and given regime R with
discount factor δ, let Ωδ(R) ⊆ Σ denote the set of (pure or mixed) S-equilibrium strategy
profiles. LS propose the following two notions of repeated implementation.3
Definition 2 (a) An SCF f is payoff-repeatedly implementable in S-equilibrium from
period τ if there exists a regime R such that Ωδ(R) is non-empty and every σ ∈ Ωδ(R)
is such that pihi (σ,R) = vi(f) for any i ∈ I, t ≥ τ and h ∈ Ht(σ,R) on the
equilibrium path.
(b) An SCF f is repeatedly implementable in S-equilibrium from period τ if there ex-
ists a regime R such that Ωδ(R) is non-empty and every σ ∈ Ωδ(R) is such that
Ah,θ(σ,R) = {f(θ)} for any t ≥ τ , θ ∈ Θ and h ∈ Ht(σ,R) on the equilibrium path.
The first notion represents repeated implementation in terms of payoffs, while the
second asks for repeated implementation of outcomes and, therefore, is a stronger concept.
Repeated implementation from some period τ requires the existence of a regime in which
every equilibrium delivers the correct continuation payoff profile or the correct outcomes
from period τ onwards for every possible sequence of state realizations.
With no restrictions on the set of feasible mechanisms and regimes, LS established
that, with some minor qualifications, an SCF satisfying efficiency in the range (strict
efficiency in the range) is payoff-repeatedly implementable (repeatedly implementable) in
Nash equilibrium.4 In this paper, we pursue repeated implementation of efficient social
choice functions using only simple finite mechanisms. Our approach involves adopting
equilibrium refinements that incorporate credibility (subgame perfection) and complexity.
While the corresponding sufficiency results in LS were based on one-shot mechanisms, the
constructive arguments in the main analysis below make use of multi-stage mechanisms
as it better facilitates our complexity treatment. We consider one-shot mechanisms in
Section 5.1.5
3In the analysis of LS, the solution concept is Nash equilibrium and only single-stage mechanisms are
considered.
4LS also showed that weak efficiency in the range is a necessary condition for Nash repeated imple-
mentation when the agents are sufficiently patient. In Section 6 below, we offer a detailed comparison
between our results and the sufficiency results of LS.
5Note that the individuals play multi-stage mechanisms repeatedly in our setup, and therefore, the
requirement of subgame perfection itself does not have the same bite as in one-shot implementation with
extensive form mechanisms.
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2.3 Complexity and Equilibrium
We next introduce a solution concept that incorporates a “small” cost associated with
implementing a more complex strategy.
Complexity of a strategy in a given regime can be measured in a number of ways. For
our analysis, it is sufficient to have a notion of complexity that captures the idea that
stationary behavior (always making the same choice) at every stage within a mechanism
is simpler than taking different actions in the mechanism at different histories.
Definition 3 For any i ∈ I and any pair of strategies σi, σ′i ∈ Σi, we say that σi is more
complex than σ′i if the strategies are identical everywhere except, after some partial history
within some mechanism, σ′i always behaves (randomizes) the same way while σi does not.
Formally, there exist some g′ ∈ G and d′ ∈ D with the following properties:
(i) σ′i(h, g, d) = σi(h, g, d) for all h ∈ H∞ and all (g, d) 6= (g′, d′) ∈ G×D.
(ii) σ′i(h, g
′, d′) = σ′i(h
′, g′, d′) for all h,h′ ∈ H∞.
(iii) σi(h, g
′, d′) 6= σi(h′, g′, d′) for some h,h′ ∈ H∞.
Notice that this definition imposes a very weak and intuitive partial order over the
strategies. It has a similar flavor to the complexity notions used by Chatterjee and
Sabourian [5], Sabourian [35] and Gale and Sabourian [12] who consider bargaining and
market games. Our results also hold with other similar complexity measures, which we
discuss in further detail in Section 5 below.
Using Definition 3, we refine the set of subgame perfect equilibria as follows.
Definition 4 A strategy profile σ is a weak perfect equilibrium with complexity cost
(WPEC) of regime R if σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and for each i ∈ I
no other strategy σ′i ∈ Σi is such that
(i) σ′i is less complex than σi; and
(ii) σ′i is a best response to σ−i at every information set for i (on or off the equilibrium).
WPEC is a very mild refinement of SPE since it requires players to adopt minimally
complex strategies among the set of strategies that are best responses at every informa-
tion set. This means that complexity appears lexicographically after both equilibrium and
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off-equilibrium payoffs in each player’s preferences. This contrasts with the more standard
equilibrium notion in the literature on complexity in repeated and bargaining games that
requires strategies to be minimally complex among those that are best responses only on
the equilibrium path (see Section 3.4 below for a formal definition).6 This latter approach,
however, has been criticized for prioritizing complexity costs ahead of off-equilibrium pay-
offs in preferences. Our notion of WPEC avoids this issue since it only excludes strategies
that are unnecessarily complex without any payoff benefit on or off the equilibrium.7
2.4 Obtaining Target Payoffs
An important feature of the constructive arguments behind LS’s sufficiency results is that
in the repeated implementation setup one can obtain the target expected payoff associated
with the desired SCF for any single player precisely as the (discounted average) expected
payoff of some history-independent and non-strategic regime, as long as the discount factor
is sufficiently large. Such regimes involve enforcement of some constant outcomes and/or
dictatorships.
A constant rule mechanism refers to a mechanism that enforces a single outcome
(constant SCF). Formally, φ(a) = (M,ψ) is a one-stage mechanism such that Mi = {∅}
for all i ∈ I and ψ(m) = a ∈ A for all m ∈ M . Also, for any SCF f ∈ F , let d(i)
denote a (one-stage) dictatorial mechanism (or simply i-dictatorship) in which agent i is
the dictator and can choose any outcome in the range of f ; thus, d(i) = (M,ψ) is such
that Mi = f(Θ), Mj = {∅} for all j 6= i and ψ(m) = mi for all m ∈M .
Note that, for any i, the dictatorship d(i) must yield a unique expected utility vii =∑
θ∈Θ p(θ) maxa∈f(Θ) ui(a, θ) to dictator i if he acts rationally in the mechanism; but since
there may not a be a unique optimal outcome for the dictator, multiple payoffs can arise
for the other players. For simplicity, we assume throughout that, for each i, d(i) also
yields a unique payoff to every j 6= i if i acts rationally. Our results below are not affected
by relaxing this assumption (see Section 1 of the Supplementary Material). Let vij denote
the unique payoff of player j from d(i) if i acts rationally, and let vi = (v1i , .., v
I
i ). Clearly,
6The two exceptions in the existing literature are Kalai and Neme [18] and Sabourian [35]. The notion
of WPEC was first introduced by [35].
7Note also that complexity cost enters the agents’ preferences lexicographically. All our results below
hold when the decision maker admits a positive trade-off between complexity cost and (on- or off-path)
payoff.
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vii ≥ vi(f).
Next, letW = {vi}i∈I∪{v(a)}a∈A denote the set of all (one-period) payoff profiles from
dictatorial and constant rule mechanisms. Then, by constructing history-independent
regimes that alternate between those mechanisms, we have the following.
Lemma 1 (a) Suppose that δ ∈ (1
2
, 1
)
. Fix any i ∈ I, and suppose that there exists an
outcome a˜i ∈ A such that vi(a˜i) ≤ vi(f). Then, there exists a history-independent regime
that generates a unique (discounted average) payoff to agent i equal to vi(f) in any Nash
equilibrium.
(b) Fix any W∗ ⊂ W and suppose that δ ∈
(
1− 1|W∗| , 1
)
. Then, for any payoff profile
w ∈ co(W∗) and any  > 0, there exists a history-independent regime that generates a
unique Nash equilibrium payoff w′ such that | w − w′ |< .
Proof. (a) Fix any i. Note that vii ≥ vi(f) ≥ vi(a˜i). Since δ > 12 , by the algorithm
of Sorin [40] (see also Lemma 3.7.1 of Mailath and Samuelson [24]), we can construct a
history-independent regime, by appropriately alternating d(i) and φ(a˜i), such that player
i obtains a unique equilibrium payoff equal to vi(f).
(b) Fix any w ∈ co(W∗) and any  > 0. Since δ ∈
(
1− 1|W∗| , 1
)
, by Sorin [40], there
exists a history-independent regime that appropriately alternates between the dictatorial
and constant rule mechanisms whose one-period payoffs belong to W∗ such that if each
dictator always picks his best one-shot alternative, the resulting discounted average payoff
profile is w. Let us denote this regime by W .
To obtain a regime that induces a unique payoff w′ such that | w−w′ |<  in any Nash
equilibrium, consider another regime that is identical to W for some finite T periods,
followed by non-contingent implementation of some arbitrary but fixed outcome in every
period thereafter. The resulting Nash equilibrium payoffs are unique since each player
must then pick his best one-shot outcome whenever he is dictator; moreover, if T is
sufficiently large, the payoffs satisfy | w − w′ |< .
Part (a) of Lemma 1 also appeared in LS; part (b) is new and will be exploited in
our analysis. We raise two remarks on the constructions in this lemma. First, while for
any w ∈ co(W∗), the algorithm of Sorin [40] implies that there must exist a regime that
induces w as a Nash equilibrium payoff profile by appropriately alternating between dic-
tatorial and constant rule mechanisms, we cannot ensure that this is the case in any Nash
equilibrium of the regime. The reason is that if the regime involves serial dictatorships
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by different players then it may be possible for collusion to occur intertemporally and
induce outcome paths that are different from those in which each dictator always follows
his unique myopic best action. Hence, a regime with infinitely many dictatorships given
to multiple players can generate multiple equilibrium payoffs. To avoid such collusive out-
comes, our construction in the proof of part (b) activates a permanent implementation of
some constant outcome beyond a certain finite period T . The uniqueness of equilibrium
continuation payoff at T ensures, via backward induction, that each player behaves my-
opically whenever he is dictator; at the same time, if T is large, the impact on the average
payoffs is small.
Second, in this paper we restrict ourselves to deterministic regimes. One consequence
of this restriction is that the results described in the above lemma require the discount
factor to be above a certain positive lower bound. Another consequence is that the regimes
constructed in the proof of the above results involve a precise sequencing of dictatorial and
constant rule mechanisms. If the planner were able to condition the choice of mechanism
on some random public signals, each of the results in the above lemma could be obtained
by constructing an alternative regime that initially chooses among the set of dictatorial
and constant rule mechanisms according to the appropriate probability distribution and
then repeats the realized mechanism forever thereafter. Such regimes establish the above
lemma for any δ and do not involve changing the mechanisms at different dates. Thus, with
public randomization, we could do away from imposing any restriction on the discount
factor and construct in some sense simpler mechanisms that do not require precise tracking
of the time.8 A public randomization device may not be available, however.
3 Two Agents
In this paper, we first report our results for I = 2. Our approach to the case of I ≥ 3
involves more complicated constructions that will build on the material of this section.
8In part (b) of Lemma 1 the payoff vector w is obtained approximately because we want to ensure that
collusion among different dictators does not occur. With public randomization, the collusion possibility
no longer poses an issue and the result in (b) can in fact be obtained exactly.
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3.1 Regime Construction
Our objective is to obtain a repeated implementation result for an SCF that is efficient
in the range. To do so, we introduce two additional properties of the SCF.
First, as in the one-shot implementation problem, there is a difference between the
two-agent and three-or-more-agent cases in our setup for ensuring the existence of truth-
telling equilibrium. This is due to the fact that, with two agents, it is not possible to
identify the misreport in the event of disagreement. One way to deter deviations from
truth-telling in our regime construction with I = 2 is to invoke an additional requirement
known as self-selection, as adopted in the one-shot literature.9 Formally, for any f , i and
θ, let Li(θ) = {a ∈ f(Θ)|ui(a, θ) ≤ ui(f(θ), θ)} be the set of outcomes among the range of
f that make agent i worse off than f . We say that f satisfies self-selection in the range if
L1(θ)∩L2 (θ′) 6= ∅ for any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ. We assume this condition here for ease of exposition.
It can be dropped when the agents are sufficiently patient, since intertemporal incentives
can then be designed to support truth-telling; see Section 2 of the Supplementary Material
for a formal analysis.
Second, as in LS, we consider SCFs induce payoffs that are, for each player, bounded
below by the payoff of some constant outcome. This enables us to appeal to Lemma 1
above to build continuation regimes that provide correct intertemporal incentives for full
repeated implementation.
Condition φ. (i) For all i ∈ I, there exists a˜i ∈ f(Θ) such that vi(a˜i) ≤ vi(f).
(ii) For all i ∈ I and γ ∈ [0, 1], v(f) 6= γvi + (1− γ)v(a˜i).
Part (i) strengthens condition ω appearing in LS by requiring the outcome a˜i to be
found in the range of the SCF, while the inequality here is allowed to be weak. The
restriction to f(Θ) is imposed to obtain repeated implementation of an SCF that is
efficient in the range and hence can be relaxed if one deals with efficiency instead. Part
(ii) is almost without loss of generality. If this were not to hold, the history-independent
regime described in the proof of part (a) of Lemma 1 would induce a unique payoff profile
equal v(f) if δ > 1/2.10
9This condition is originally from Dutta and Sen [8] and is weaker than the “bad outcome” condition
in Moore and Repullo [32].
10In fact, by Fudenberg and Maskin [11], one could also build a regime such that the agents’ continuation
payoffs at every date approximate v(f) with δ sufficiently close to 1.
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Using condition φ, we can construct some history-independent regimes that yield
unique average payoffs with the following specific properties.
Lemma 2 Suppose that I = 2, and fix an SCF f that satisfies efficiency in the range and
condition φ. Suppose also that δ ∈ (3
4
, 1
)
. Then, we obtain the following:
(a) For each i ∈ I, there exists a history-independent regime, referred to as Si, that
yields a unique Nash equilibrium (discounted average) payoff profile wi = (wi1, w
i
2)
such that
wii = vi(f) and w
i
j < vj(f), j 6= i.
(b) There exist history-independent regimes {X(t)}t=1,2,... and Y that respectively in-
duce unique Nash equilibrium payoff profiles x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t)) and y = (y1, y2)
satisfying the following condition:
w21 < y1 < x1(t) < w
1
1 and w
1
2 < x2(t) < y2 < w
2
2. (1)
Proof. (a) Fix any i. Then, by part (a) of Lemma 1, there exists a regime Si that induces
a unique payoff profile wi = (wi1, w
i
2) such that w
i
i = vi(f). Efficiency in the range of f
and part (ii) of condition φ imply that, for j 6= i, wij < vj(f).
(b) To construct regimes {X(t)}t=1,2,... and Y , we first set, for each date t,
x′(t) = λ(t)w1 + (1− λ(t))w2 and y′ = µw1 + (1− µ)w2
for some 0 < µ < λ(t) < 1. Since wji < w
i
i for all i, j, i 6= j, the resulting payoffs satisfy,
for any t,
w21 < y
′
1 < x
′
1(t) < w
1
1 and w
1
2 < x
′
2(t) < y
′
2 < w
2
2. (2)
Since wi is itself generated by a convex combination of vi and v(a˜i), it follows that
x′(t) and y′ can be written as convex combinations of v1, v2, v(a˜1) and v(a˜2). Then, since
δ > 3/4, and by part (b) of Lemma 1, there must exist history-independent regimes that
induce unique equilibrium payoffs that are arbitrarily close to x′(t) and y′. Since x′(t)
and y′ satisfy the strict inequalities described in (2), we also have regimes X(t), for each
t, and Y that induce unique payoffs x(t) and y, respectively, satisfying (1).
We assume throughout in this section that δ > 3/4 as required by Lemma 2. As
mentioned before, this assumption is not needed with a public randomization device as
the results described in Lemma 2 could then be obtained for any δ (see footnote 14 below).
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These constructions are illustrated in Figure 1 below (where, with slight abuse of
notation, pii refers to i’s average repeated game payoff).
Figure 1: Regime construction
pi2
pi1
v22
v(f)
v11
w22 = v2(f)
w11 = v1(f)
v(a˜1)
v(a˜2)
w12
w21
x(t)
y
Now, for an SCF f that satisfies efficiency in the range, self-selection in the range and
condition φ, we define the following multi-stage mechanism, referred to as ge:
• Stage 1 - Each agent i = 1, 2 announces a state, θi, from Θ.
• Stage 2 - Each agent announces an integer, zi, from the set Z ≡ {0, 1, 2}.
The outcome function of this mechanism depends solely on the agents’ announcement
of states in Stage 1 and is given below:
(i) If θ1 = θ2 = θ, f(θ) is implemented.
(ii) Otherwise, an outcome from the set L1(θ2) ∩ L2(θ1) is implemented.
Using this mechanism together with the history-independent regimes X(t) and Y
constructed above, we define regime Re inductively as follows.
First, mechanism ge is played in t = 1. Second, if, at some date t ≥ 1, ge is the
mechanism played with a pair of states θ˜ = (θ1, θ2) announced in Stage 1 followed by
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integers z˜ = (z1, z2) in Stage 2, the continuation mechanism or regime at the next period
is given by the transition rules below:
• Rule A.1: If z1 = z2 = 0, then the mechanism next period is ge.
• Rule A.2: If zi > 0 and zj = 0 for some i, j = 1, 2, then the continuation regime is
Si.
• Rule A.3: If z1, z2 > 0, then we have the following:
– Rule A.3(i): If z1 = z2 = 1, the continuation regime is X ≡ X(t˜) for some
arbitrary but fixed t˜, with the payoffs henceforth denoted by x.
– Rule A.3(ii): If z1 = z2 = 2, the continuation regime is X(t).
– Rule A.3(iii): If z1 6= z2, the continuation regime is Y .
This regime thus employs only the outcomes in the range of the SCF, f(Θ). Let us
summarize other key features of this regime construction. First, in mechanism ge, which
deploys only two stages, the implemented outcome depends solely on the announcement of
states, while the integers dictate the continuation mechanism. The set of integers contains
only three elements. Second, announcement of any non-zero integer effectively ends the
strategic part of the game. When only one agent, say i, announces a positive integer this
agent obtains his target payoff vi(f) in the continuation regime S
i (Rule A.2). The rest
of transitions are designed to rule out unwanted randomization behavior. In particular,
when both agents report positive integers, by (1), the continuation regimes are such that
the corresponding continuation payoffs, x(t) or y, are strictly Pareto-dominated by the
target payoffs v(f). Furthermore, when both agents report integer 2 (Rule A.3(ii)) the
continuation regimes could actually be different across periods. This feature will later be
used to facilitate our complexity refinement arguments.
Note that, in this regime, the histories that involve strategic play are only those at
which the agents engage in mechanism ge. At any other public history h, the continuation
regime is Si, X(t) for some t or Y involving only dictatorial and constant rule mechanisms.
Furthermore, by Lemma 2, in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the continuation payoff
at any such h is unique and given by wi, x(t) for some t or y, respectively, satisfying the
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conditions described in Lemma 2 if δ > 3/4.11
As mentioned before, the only histories that matter for strategic play here are those
at which the next mechanism is ge. Therefore, with some abuse of notation, we simplify
the definitions of relevant histories and strategies for the above regime as follows.
We denote by Ht the set of all finite histories observed by the agents at the beginning
of period t given that the mechanism to play in t is ge; let H∞ = ∪∞t=1Ht. Let D1 = Θ and
D2 = Θ×ΘI denote the set of partial histories at Stage 1 and at Stage 2 of the two-stage
mechanism ge, respectively. Thus, d = θ is a partial history that represents the beginning
of Stage 1 after state θ has been realized, and d = (θ, θ˜) ∈ D2 refers to the beginning of
Stage 2 after realization of θ followed by profile θ˜ ∈ Θ2 announced in Stage 1.
Then, a mixed (behavioral) strategy of agent i = 1, 2 in regime Re is written simply
as the mapping σi : H
∞×D → (4Θ)∪ (4Z) such that, for any h ∈ H∞, σi(h, d) ∈ 4Θ
if d ∈ D1 and σi(h, d) ∈ 4Z if d ∈ D2. Let Σi be the set of i’s strategies in Re. We write
pihi (σ,R
e) as player i’s continuation payoff under strategy profile σ at history h ∈ H∞.
3.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We first consider the set of subgame perfect equilibria of the above regime. Let us begin
by establishing existence of an equilibrium in which the desired social choice is always im-
plemented. In this equilibrium, both players adopt Markov strategies, always announcing
the true state followed by integer zero.
Lemma 3 Regime Re admits a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), σ∗, in Markov strate-
gies such that, for any t, h ∈ Ht and θ ∈ Θ, (i) gh(σ∗, Re) = ge and (ii) Ah,θ(σ∗, Re) =
{f(θ)}.
Proof. Consider σ∗ ∈ Σ such that, for all i, σ∗i (h, θ) = θ for all h ∈ H∞ and θ ∈ D1, and
σ∗i (h, (θ, θ˜)) = 0 for all h ∈ H∞ and (θ, θ˜) ∈ D2.12 Clearly, this profile satisfies (i) and
(ii) in the claim. Thus, at any h ∈ H∞, pihi (σ∗, Re) = vi(f) for all i.
11If regimes with random transitions are feasible then we can obtain the same results with no restriction
on δ by constructing an alternative regime that is otherwise identical to Re except that whenever at least
one player announces a positive integer, the counterpart regime randomizes, with appropriate probability
distributions, between four stationary continuation regimes, each of which repeatedly enforces d(1), d(2),
φ(a˜1) or φ(a˜2).
12Here we have abused the notation slightly to describe pure strategies.
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To show that σ∗ is an SPE, consider a unilateral one-step deviation by any agent i.
Fix any h ∈ H∞. There are two cases to consider. First, fix any partial history θ. By
the outcome function of ge and self-selection in the range, one-step deviation to a non-
truthful state does not improve one-period payoff; also, since the other player’s strategy
is Markov and the transition rules do not depend on Stage 1 actions, the continuation
payoff at the next period is unaffected. Second, fix any partial history
(
θ, θ˜). In this case,
by Rule A.2, the continuation payoff from deviating to any positive integer is identical to
the equilibrium payoff, which is equal to vi(f).
We now turn to characterizing the properties of the set of SPEs. Our next Lemma is
concerned with the players’ equilibrium behavior whenever they face Stage 2 (the integer
part) of mechanism ge. It shows that at any such history both players must be either
playing 0 for sure and obtaining the target payoffs v(f) in the continuation game next
period, or mixing between 1 and 2 for sure and obtaining less than v(f). Thus, in terms of
continuation payoffs, mixing is strictly Pareto-dominated by the pure strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Consider any SPE of regime Re. Fix any t, h ∈ Ht and d = (θ, θ˜) ∈ D2.
Then, one of the following must hold at (h, d):
(a) Each agent i announces 0 for sure and his continuation payoff at the next period is
vi(f).
(b) Each agent i announces 1 or 2 for sure, with the probability of choosing 1 equal to
xi(t)−yi
xi+xi(t)−2yi ∈ (0, 1), and his continuation payoff at the next period is less than vi(f).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
To gain intuition for the above result, consider the matrix below that contains the
corresponding continuation payoffs when at least one player announces a positive integer.
First, from Figure 2, the inequalities of (1) imply that any equilibrium with pure
strategy at the relevant history must play 0. Since the continuation regime Si gives i his
target payoff wii = vi(f) and a payoff, w
i
j, that is strictly lower than yj for the other player
j, a strictly profitable deviation opportunity arises whenever there is an “odd-one-out”
announcing a positive integer; if both players announce positive integers, the fact that
x1(t) > y1 and y2 > x2(t) imply that a deviation opportunity exists for one of the two
players.
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Figure 2: Continuation payoffs
Player 2
0 1 2
0 · w2 w2
Player 1 1 w1 x y
2 w1 y x(t)
Second, if all the players announce zero, it then follows that each player i’s continuation
payoff must be bounded below by vi(f) since, otherwise, the player could deviate by
reporting a positive integer and obtain vi(f) from the continuation regime S
i (Rule A.2).
Since this is true for all i, the efficiency in the range of the SCF then implies that the
continuation payoffs are equal to the target payoffs for all agents.
Next, we show that if the players are mixing over integers then zero cannot be chosen.
Since xi(t) > w
j
i and yi > w
j
i for i, j = 1, 2, the transition rules imply that each agent
prefers to announce 1 than to announce 0 if the other player is announcing a positive
integer for sure. It then follows that if agent i attaches a positive weight to 0 then the
other agent j must also do the same, and i’s continuation payoff is at least vi(f), with it
being strictly greater than vi(f) when j plays a positive integer with positive probability.
Applying this argument to both agents leads to a contradiction against the assumption
that the SCF is efficient in the range.
Finally, i’s continuation payoff at the next period when both choose a positive integer
is xi, xi(t) or y. The precise probability of choosing integer 1 by i in the case of mixing is
determined trivially by these payoffs as in the lemma. Also, since these payoffs are all by
assumption less than vi(f), we have that mixing results in continuation payoffs strictly
below the target levels.
Given Lemma 4, we can also show that if the players were to mix over integers at
any history on the equilibrium path, it must occur in period 1; otherwise, both players
must be playing 0 in the previous period where either player i could profitably deviate
by announcing a positive integer and activating continuation regime Si. The properties
of subgame perfect equilibria of our regime can then be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 Consider any SPE σ of regime Re. Then, one of the following must hold:
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(a) Each agent i announces 0 for sure at any (h, d) ∈ H∞×D2 on the equilibrium path,
and pihi (σ,R
e) = vi(f) for any t ≥ 2 and h ∈ Ht on the equilibrium path.
(b) Each agent i mixes between 1 and 2 at some d ∈ D2 in period 1 on the equilib-
rium path, and his continuation payoff at the next period is less than vi(f); hence,
pii(σ,R
e) < vi(f) if δ is sufficiently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Thus, if we restrict attention to pure strategies, the first part of this Proposition
and Lemma 3 imply that we obtain payoff-repeated implementation in subgame perfect
equilibrium from period 2.13 Furthermore, any mixed strategy equilibrium of our regime
is strictly Pareto-dominated by any pure strategy equilibrium in terms of continuation
payoffs from period 2.
3.3 WPEC
Our characterization of SPEs of regime Re demonstrates that in any equilibrium the
players must either continue along the desired path of play or fall into coordination failure
early on in the game by mixing over the positive integers in period 1 which leads to strictly
inefficient continuation payoffs. We now introduce our refinement (WPEC) arguments
based on complexity considerations to select the former.
In order to obtain our selection results, we add to the construction of Re the following
property: the sequence of regimes {X(t)}∞t=1 is such that, in addition to (1) above, the
corresponding payoffs {x(t)}∞t=1 satisfy
x1(t
′) 6= x1(t′′) and x2(t′) 6= x2(t′′) for some t′, t′′. (3)
Note that one way to achieve this involves taking the sequence {λ(t) : λ(t) ∈ (µ, 1) ∀(t)}
used to construct these regimes in the proof of part (b) of Lemma 2 and set it such that
λ(t′) 6= λ(t′′) for at least two distinct dates t′ and t′′.
Clearly, this additional feature does not alter Lemmas 3 and 4. However, it implies
for any SPE that, if at some period t on or off the equilibrium path, an agent mixes
13Note that, in part (a) of Proposition 1, there might still exist equilibria where players randomize over
different state announcements at the first stage of the extensive form mechanism at any period. Even so,
efficiency implies that they obtain the continuation payoff profile v(f).
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over integers, by choosing integer 1 with probability xi(t)−yi
xi+xi(t)−2yi , then his behavior in the
integer part of mechanism ge is not stationary across periods.14
We next show that if the players face a small cost of implementing a more complex
strategy, mixing over integers can no longer be part of equilibrium behavior in our regime.
Lemma 5 Fix any WPEC of regime Re. Also, fix any t, h ∈ Ht and d ∈ D2 (on or off
the equilibrium path). Then, each agent announces zero for sure at this history.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
To obtain this lemma we suppose otherwise. Then, some agent must respond differ-
ently to some partial history d ∈ D2 depending on what happened in the past. But then,
this agent could deviate to another less complex strategy identical to the equilibrium
strategy everywhere except that it always responds to d by announcing 1 and obtain the
same payoff at every history. Three crucial features of our regime construction deliver
this argument. First, the deviation is less complex because the mixing probabilities are
uniquely determined by the date t and, hence, the equilibrium strategy must prescribe
different behaviors at different histories. Second, since the players can only randomize
between 1 and 2, the deviation would not affect payoffs at histories where the equilibrium
strategies randomize. Finally, since at histories where the equilibrium strategies do not
mix they report 0 for sure with continuation payoffs equal to v(f), by reporting 1 the
deviator becomes the “odd-one-out” and ensures the same target payoff.
Note that, since Markov strategies are simplest strategies according to Definition 3,
Lemma 3 continues to hold with WPEC. Thus, combining the previous lemmas, we es-
tablish the following main result.
Theorem 1 Suppose that I = 2 and δ ∈ (3
4
, 1
)
. If an SCF f is efficient in the range, and
satisfies self-selection in the range and condition φ, f is payoff-repeatedly implementable
in WPEC from period 2.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemmas 3-5.
14Our results are unaffected by making X(·) dependent on the entire history and not just its date. See
Section 7 for further discussion on this issue.
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Notice that the extent of implementation achieved here actually goes beyond that of
Definition 2 and Theorem 1 since we obtain the desired payoffs at every on- and off -the-
equilibrium history after period 1 at which mechanism ge is played. To see this, combine
Lemma 5 with part (a) of Lemma 4.
To obtain repeated implementation in terms of outcomes, as in LS, we need to go be-
yond efficiency in the range. LS assume pure strategies and hence invoke strict efficiency;
here, we use strong efficiency.
Corollary 1 Suppose that, in addition to the conditions in Theorem 1, f is strongly
efficient in the range. Then, f is repeatedly implementable in WPEC from period 2.
Proof. It suffices to show that every WPEC σ of Re is such that Ah,θ(σ,Re) = {f(θ)}
for any t ≥ 2, h ∈ Ht(σ,Re) and θ ∈ Θ.
Fix any WPEC σ of regime Re. Also, fix any t ≥ 2 and h ∈ Ht. For each θ and
a ∈ f(Θ), let r(a, θ) denote the probability that outcome a is implemented in equilibrium
at (h, θ). By Lemmas 4 and 5, we know that, for any i,
pihi (σ,R
e) = (1− δ)
∑
θ∈Θ,a∈f(Θ)
p(θ)r(a, θ)ui (a, θ) + δvi(f) = vi(f),
which implies that
∑
θ∈Θ,a∈f(Θ) p(θ)r(a, θ)ui (a, θ) = vi(f).
Strong efficiency in the range implies that there does not exist a random SCF ξ : Θ→
4 (f(Θ)) such that v(ξ) = v(f). Therefore, the claim follows.
3.4 Further Refinement and Period 1
Our results do not ensure implementation of the desired outcomes in period 1. One way
to sharpen our results in this direction is to consider a stronger equilibrium refinement in
line with the standard literature on strategic complexity in dynamic games (e.g. Abreu
and Rubinstein [2], Sabourian [35], Lee and Sabourian [20]) and to require the strategies
to be minimally complex mutual best responses only on the equilibrium path.
Definition 5 A strategy profile σ is a perfect equilibrium with complexity cost (PEC) of
regime Re if σ is an SPE and for each i ∈ I no other strategy σ′i ∈ Σi is such that (i) σ′i
is less complex than σi and (ii) σ
′
i is a best response to σ−i.
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Compared with WPEC, this concept prioritizes the complexity of their strategies over
off-the-equilibrium payoffs and hence selects minimally complex strategies over a larger
set.
An alternative way of thinking about the issue of credibility of strategies and com-
plexity considerations is to introduce two kinds of perturbations and find the limiting
Nash equilibrium behavior as these perturbations become arbitrarily small (e.g. Chatter-
jee and Sabourian [5], Sabourian [35] and Gale and Sabourian [12]). One perturbation
allows for a small but positive cost of choosing a more complex strategy; another per-
turbation represents a small but positive and independent probability of making an error
(off-the-equilibrium-path move). The notions of WPEC and PEC can then be interpreted
as the limiting Nash behavior as the two types of perturbation go to zero. The difference
is that the WPEC results hold for such limiting equilibria independently of the order of
the limiting arguments, while with PEC the order of limit is the complexity cost first and
then the tremble.
Clearly, the Markov equilibrium constructed for Lemma 3 is a PEC, and since WPEC is
itself a PEC, all our previous results on the properties of WPEC above remain valid under
PEC. Additionally, we can show that every PEC in regime Re must be Markov. Therefore,
under the notion of PEC, the same repeated implementation results as in Theorem 1 above
are obtained from period 1.15Appendix A.2 presents the formal details.16
4 Three or More Agents
In this section, we extend the arguments developed for the two-agent case to deal with
the case of three or more agents.
15Similar complexity considerations were introduced by LS (see the Supplemental Material [22]) to their
constructions with integer games to achieve efficient repeated implementation from period 1. Mezzetti
and Renou [29] show repeated Nash implementation of dynamically monotonic SCFs from t = 1.
16Our WPEC and PEC results in this paper assume lexicographic preferences with respect to complexity
cost. The same set of results also hold when the agents make a positive trade-off between complexity
cost and payoffs. This is because the set of equilibria then is contained in the set of equilibria with
lexicographic preferences, while our regime constructions admit an equilibrium that is Markov and hence
cannot be improved upon in terms of complexity.
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4.1 Regime Construction
An important part of our constructive arguments with two agents above was to construct
for each i a history-independent and non-strategic regime Si that generates a payoff profile
wi = (wii, w
i
j) such that w
i
i = vi(f) and w
i
j < vj(f). This was facilitated by condition φ.
To address the problem of three or more agents, we make use of a slightly strengthened
version below. Similarly to before, assume for simplicity that every i-dictatorship yields
unique payoffs under rational dictator.
Condition φ∗. (i) There exists a˜ ∈ A such that vi(a˜) < vi(f) for all i ∈ I.
(ii) vji (f(Θ)) < vi(f) for all i, j ∈ I, i 6= j.
Part (i) states that there exists some outcome that is strictly worse for all agents
than the given SCF in expectation. It is similar to but weaker than the “bad outcome”
condition in Moore and Repullo (1990) as the outcome a˜ is compared to the SCF only on
average (and not in every state). This amounts to a weak requirement on the SCF and is
naturally satisfied in many environments (e.g. zero consumption in allocation problems).
Part (ii) here would be satisfied with weak inequality when there are two agents and f is
efficient in the range.
Now, consider any SCF that is efficient in the range and satisfies condition φ∗. Then,
as in the two-player case, by part (i) of condition φ∗ and by part (a) of Lemma 1, one
can construct for each agent i a regime Si that induces a unique Nash equilibrium payoff
profile wi = (wi1, . . . , w
i
I) such that w
i
i = vi(f). Efficiency in the range of f and condition
φ∗ imply that, for j 6= i, wij < vj(f).
Fix any two agents k and l, and the corresponding regimes Sk and Sl with unique
payoffs wk and wl. We can further extend part (b) of Lemma 2 for the two-agent case to
show the existence of the following (history-independent) regimes.
Lemma 6 Suppose that f is efficient in the range and satisfies condition φ∗. Also,
suppose that δ ∈
(
1− 1|I|+1 , 1
)
. Then, for any subset of agents C ⊆ I and each date
t = 1, 2, . . ., there exist regimes SC , X(t), Y that respectively induce unique Nash equilib-
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rium payoff profiles wC , x(t), y ∈ co(V (f)) satisfying the following conditions:17
wlk < yk < xk(t) < w
k
k and w
k
l < xl(t) < yl < w
l
l (4)
xk(t
′) 6= xk(t′′) and xl(t′) 6= xl(t′′) for some t′, t′′ (5)
wCk < w
k
k if C 6= {k} and wCl < wll if C 6= {l} (6)
wCi > w
C\{i}
i for all i ∈ C. (7)
Proof. Given the two fixed agents k and l, and the corresponding regimes Sk and Sl, we
construct regimes {X(t)}t=1,2,... and Y to satisfy (4) and (5) similarly to their two-agent
counterparts.
To construct SC , fix any C ⊆ I, and let wC = 1|C|
∑
i∈C w
i. Since wjj > w
i
j for all
i, j ∈ I, j 6= i, {wC}C satisfy the strict inequalities described in (6) and (7). Furthermore,
since wi is generated by a convex combination of vi and v(a˜), wC can be written as a
convex combination of v1, . . . , vI and v(a˜). Then, since δ > 1 − 1|I|+1 , and by part (b)
of Lemma 1, there must exist a history-independent regime that induces a unique Nash
payoff profile that is arbitrarily close to wC . Since {wC}C satisfy the strict inequalities
as in (6) and (7), there in turn exists a regime SC which induces a unique Nash payoff
profile wC such that (6) and (7) are satisfied.
Using the constructions in Lemma 6, we extend the regime construction for the case
of I = 2 to the case of I ≥ 3. Fix throughout δ > 1− 1|I|+1 .
First, define the sequential mechanism gˆe as follows:
• Stage 1 - Each agent i announces a state from Θ.
• Stage 2 - Each of agents k and l announces an integer from the set {0, 1, 2}; each
i ∈ I\{k, l} announces an integer from the set {0, 1}.
The outcome function of this mechanism again depends solely on the action of Stage
1 and is given below:
(i) If at least I − 1 agents announce θ, then f(θ) is implemented.
(ii) Otherwise, f(θ˜) for some arbitrary but fixed θ˜ is implemented.
It is important to note that this mechanism extends mechanism ge above by allowing
only two agents to choose from {0, 1, 2} while all the remaining agents choose from just
{0, 1}.
17Note that when C consists of single player i, SC means Si and wC = wi.
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Next, using the constructions in Lemma 6 above, we define new regime R̂e inductively
as follows: (i) mechanism gˆe is implemented at t = 1 and (ii) if, at some date t, gˆe is the
mechanism played with a profile of states θ˜ = (θ1, . . . , θI) announced in Stage 1 and a pro-
file of integers z˜ = (z1, . . . , zI) announced in Stage 2, the continuation mechanism/regime
at the next period is as follows:
• Rule B.1: If zi = 0 for all i, then the mechanism next period is gˆe.
• Rule B.2: If zk > 0 and zl = 0 (zk = 0 and zl > 0), then the continuation regime is
Sk (Sl).
• Rule B.3: If zk, zl > 0, then we have the following:
– Rule B.3(i): If zk = zl = 1, then the continuation regime is X ≡ X(t˜) for some
arbitrary but fixed t˜, with the payoffs henceforth denoted by x.
– Rule B.3(ii): If zk = zl = 2, then the continuation regime is X(t).
– Rule B.3(iii): If zk 6= zl, then the continuation regime is Y .
• Rule B.4: If, for some C ⊆ I\{k, l}, zi = 1 for all i ∈ C and zi = 0 for all i /∈ C,
then the continuation regime is SC .
This regime extends the two-agent counterpart Re by essentially maintaining all the
features for two players (k and l) and endowing the other agents with the choice of just
0 or 1. However, the regime prioritizes these two selected agents when determining the
transition of mechanism: note from Rules B.2 and B.3 that if either k or l plays a non-zero
integer the integer choices of other players are irrelevant to transitions. We emphasize
that the size of the integer set in our construction is actually independent of the number
of agents. Histories, partial histories (within period), strategies and continuation payoffs
are defined similarly to their two-agent counterparts.
4.2 Results
We present below our main results for the case of I ≥ 3. First, we obtain properties of
SPEs of regime R̂e above that parallel Proposition 1 for the two-agent case.
Proposition 2 Consider any SPE σ of regime R̂e. Then, one of the following must hold:
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(a) Each agent i ∈ I announces 0 for sure at any (h, d) ∈ H∞ ×D2 on the equilibrium
path, and pihi (σ, R̂
e) = vi(f) for any t ≥ 2 and h ∈ Ht on the equilibrium path.
(b) Agents k and l mix between 1 and 2 at some d ∈ D2 in period 1 on the equilibrium
path and, for each i ∈ I, the continuation payoff at the next period is less than vi(f);
hence, for each i ∈ I, pii(σ, R̂e) < vi(f) if δ is sufficiently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Characterizing the set of equilibria of regime R̂e is more involved but essentially yield
the same set of results as in the case of two agents. The key feature of our regime
construction with I ≥ 3 that extends the previous ideas with I = 2 is that R̂e treats two
(arbitrary but fixed) agents asymmetrically. Let us offer a brief sketch of our arguments
for Proposition 2.
First, suppose that the players choose pure strategies over integers. We want to show
that in this case the agents must all play 0. On the one hand, note that when either of the
two selected agents k and l announces a positive integer the integer choice of any other
agent does not matter at all (Rules B.2 and B.3). Thus, the inequalities in (4) imply
that, by the analogous arguments in the two-agent case above, k and l must report 0 in
equilibrium. On the other hand, if k and l both announce 0 and another agent reports
integer 1, by (6) and Rule B.4, either k or l could profitably deviate by announcing a
positive integer himself.
Second, suppose that some player randomizes over integers. We want to show that
in this case k and l must mix between integers 1 and 2. Suppose otherwise, so that
either k or l plays 0 with positive probability. Similarly to the two-agent case above, our
construction here is such that both k and l strictly prefer to announce a positive integer
over 0 if there is another player (possibly other than themselves) announcing a positive
integer. Therefore, if either k or l chooses 0 with positive probability then every other
agent must do the same and the corresponding continuation payoff for k or l is at least
vk(f) or vl(f), with the inequality being strict if another agent chooses a positive integer
with positive probability. Furthermore, using (7), we can show that it is also true for any
agent i other than k or l that his continuation payoff from choosing 0 is at least vi(f) if
every other agent announces 0 with positive probability. Combining these observations
leads to a contradiction against the assumption that the SCF is efficient in the range.
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Introducing complexity considerations to regime R̂e yields that the players must always
play 0 for sure in any WPEC. Given (5), again, the arguments are similar to those for
the two-agent case. Also, the regime admits a Markov equilibrium in which the agents
always tell the truth and announce 0. Thus, together with Proposition 2, we next obtain
the following.
Theorem 2 Suppose that I ≥ 3 and δ ∈
(
1− 1|I|+1 , 1
)
. If an SCF f is efficient in
the range and satisfies condition φ∗, f is payoff-repeatedly implementable in WPEC from
period 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
As in Corollary 1 for the case of I = 2, we can strengthen Theorem 2 to outcome
implementation by additionally invoking strong efficiency in the range. Also, we can
introduce the stronger refinement notion of PEC in the same way as in the case of I = 2
and obtain repeated implementation from period 1.
5 Alternative Complexity Measures and Simultane-
ous Mechanisms
5.1 More Complete Complexity Orders and Simultaneous Mech-
anisms
Our notion of complexity in Definition 3 (as well as the alternative notions introduced in
Definitions 7 and 8 below) is a partial order over strategies as it compares only strategies
that always play the same action with those that do not. We could make such ordering
more complete and obtain the same set of results with any notion of complexity that
satisfies the conditions specified in Definition 3 or else. For example, take the two-agent
case and consider two strategies that are identical everywhere except that in the integer
part of the mechanism ge the first strategy always announces integer 0 or 1, while the
second strategy either announces integer 0, 1 or mixes between integers 0 and 1 depending
on the partial history. According to the definitions discussed in the previous subsection,
one cannot rank the two strategies whereas it may be argued that the first strategy is
less complex than the second because the range of choices is smaller for the first. Let us
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present a measure of complexity capturing this idea which is a more complete order than
that in Definition 3. This measure is used in Gale and Sabourian [12].
Definition 6 For any i ∈ I and any pair of strategies σi, σ′i ∈ Σi, we say that σi is more
complex than σ′i if the strategies are identical everywhere except, after some partial history
in some mechanism and some set of histories, σ′i always behaves (randomizes) the same
way while σi does not. Formally, there exist some g
′ ∈ G, d′ ∈ D and H′ ⊆ H∞ with the
following properties:
(i) σ′i(h, g, d) = σi(h, g, d) if either h ∈ H∞\H′, or h ∈ H′ and (g, d) 6= (g′, d′) ∈ G×D.
(ii) σ′i(h, g
′, d′) = σ′i(h
′, g′, d′) for all h,h′ ∈ H′.
(iii) σi(h, g
′, d′) 6= σi(h′, g′, d′) for some h,h′ ∈ H′.
(iv) σi(h, g
′, d′) 6= σi(h′, g′, d′) for all h ∈ H′ and all h′ /∈ H′.
This definition allows us to compare strategies that differ only on some set of histories
H′.18 Clearly, if a strategy σi is more complex than σ′i according to Definition 6 then it is
also more complex according to Definition 3. Hence, all our characterization results hold
with this new definition.
The choice of complexity measure is also related to our constructive arguments. In
particular, our analysis is built on regime constructions employing sequential mechanisms
since, as should be clear from our WPEC arguments above, this allows us to treat com-
plexity of behavior regarding states and integers differently, and invoke a minimal partial
order over the set of strategies as in Definition 3. If one invokes a stronger notion of com-
plexity such as Definition 6, our results can also be obtained with constructions involving
simultaneous mechanisms as long as the agents are sufficiently patient; see Section 3 of
the Supplementary Material.
Finally, it is also possible to adopt complete complexity orders such as counting the
number of “states of the minimal automaton” implementing the strategy (e.g. Abreu
and Rubinstein [2]),19 or the “collapsing state condition” (e.g. Binmore, Piccione and
18Note that condition (iv) is assumed here in order to ensure that the complexity partial order is
asymmetric, as in Gale and Sabourian [12].
19This measure is equivalent to counting the number of “continuation strategies” induced by the strat-
egy (e.g. Kalai and Stanford [19], Lee and Sabourian [20]).
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Samuelson [3]), and obtain all our results above. To gain some intuition, consider an
automaton implementing a WPEC strategy in regime Re which randomizes over integers
at some history; by condition (3), it follows that the automaton must use at least two
different states in order to induce the behavior in the integer part of mechanism ge. But
then, we derive a contradiction as there exists a simpler automaton that does not affect the
corresponding player’s continuation payoff anywhere: the alternative automaton employs
just a single state to play integers in which it announces integer 1.20
5.2 Cost of Recalling History
The basic idea behind our complexity measure is that if a strategy conditions its actions
less on what happened in the “past” than another strategy then the strategy is simpler
than the other. Definition 3 above captures this by saying that, whenever playing some
mechanism, a strategy that at every date t responds identically to some partial history
d, independently of the previous history of play h before t, is less complex than one that
responds differently to the same partial history d but is identical everywhere else.
According to this definition, the “past” that matters for complexity of a strategy in
any given period is not what happened within the period but the play that precedes it.
Thus, a simple strategy may still announce different messages at different partial histories.
An intuitive justification for such an asymmetric treatment of history of outcomes before
and within a period in our definition of complexity is the following: there is a memory
cost for recalling history of actions before the current period whereas the partial history
within the period is just some stimulus that involves no cost of recalling. For example,
in repeated interactions, substantial time lags often exist between periods so that costly
memory is needed to condition the current action on the play of previous periods while
the delay between receiving information about the partial history and taking an action is
insignificant. Since our regimes involve two-stage sequential mechanisms in each period,
this justification of Definition 3 also means that the time lag between players’ turns
across the two stages of each period are inconsequential, or at least less important than
the distance between two periods, in terms of complexity of a strategy.
Such sharp asymmetric treatment, however, may not always be reasonable and one
20Note that the transition from this single state is not an issue since the regime activates a permanent
sequence of dictatorships and constant outcomes, and the game effectively ends, once a positive integer
is announced.
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may want to ask how robust our results are to a less stark treatment of the history before
the period and the partial history within it. We offer two extensions for the strategies in
our regimes Re and R̂e. One possibility is to differentiate the partial histories that occur
in the two stages of the sequential mechanism on the grounds that there is a significant
time lag between stages. More specifically, we can assume that in each period, while
nature’s move θ is simply some stimulus that is known at no cost when the players are
asked to announce a state at the beginning of the first stage, recalling partial history that
occurred in the first stage when making integer announcements in the second stage is
costly, due to the significant time lag between stages. In the presence of such costs, we
need to modify our previous definition of complexity so that conditioning behavior on the
partial history of play in the first stage of the mechanism is also more complex than not
doing so. A complexity measure that reflects this idea is introduced below.
Definition 7 For any i ∈ I and any pair of strategies σi, σ′i ∈ Σi, we say that σi is more
complex than σ′i if one of the following holds:
(i) There exists d′ ∈ D1 such that the three conditions in Definition 3 are satisfied.
(ii) σ′i(h, d) = σi(h, d) for all h ∈ H∞ and all d ∈ D1,
σ′i(h, d) = σ
′
i(h
′, d′) for all h,h′ ∈ H∞ and all d, d′ ∈ D2, and
σi(h, d) 6= σi(h′, d′) for some h,h′ ∈ H∞ and some d, d′ ∈ D2.
Notice that the continuation payoff at the beginning of each first stage before the
players announce states may depend on the partial history at that stage (the payoff in
the current stage depends on the true state θ), whereas the continuation payoff at the
beginning of the second stage does not depend on the partial history at the the second
stage. Assuming that players have the knowledge of current and future payoffs would
therefore mean that one should treat nature’s move differently from other partial histories
for its payoff relevance. This provides another justification for the different treatments in
Definition 7 of the partial histories across the two stages .
It is straightforward to verify that our WPEC results above are not affected in any
way by imposing Definition 7 instead. In particular, recall from the proof of Lemma 5
that if a WPEC were to involve mixing over integers at any history, deviating to another
strategy that is otherwise the same except that it always announces integer 1 at every
32
information set in the second stage would always generate the same payoff. This deviating
strategy is simpler than the equilibrium strategy according the new definition as well.
Yet another approach to the treatment of the partial histories would be to treat in-
formation at any decision node identically and say that a strategy that announces the
same integer or state regardless of both the history before the date and the partial history
within the date is less complex than one that announces different integers or states while
being identical everywhere else.
Definition 8 For any i ∈ I and any pair of strategies σi, σ′i ∈ Σi, we say that σi is more
complex than σ′i if there exists l ∈ {1, 2} with the following properties:
(i) σ′i(h, d) = σi(h, d) for all h ∈ H∞ and all d /∈ Dl.
(ii) σ′i(h, d) = σ
′
i(h
′, d′) for all h,h′ ∈ H∞ and all d, d′ ∈ Dl.
(iii) σi(h, d) 6= σi(h′, d′) for some h,h′ ∈ H∞ and some d, d′ ∈ Dl.
Under this definition, complexity-averse players may want to economize even on the
responsiveness of their behavior to nature’s move θ at the beginning of each period. As we
have already argued, this approach may not be as plausible as Definition 3 or 7 because
nature’s moves are payoff-relevant and therefore assuming that it is costly to recall them
amounts to assuming that the knowledge of continuation payoffs are costly to acquire.
With Definition 8, our characterization of WPECs of the regimes Re for I = 2 and
R̂e for I ≥ 3 actually remain valid via identical arguments. However, these regimes may
not admit an equilibrium since the players may find it beneficial to economize on the
complexity of their reports in the first stage by make unconditional state announcements.
To see this, consider the type of strategies that we have used to obtain existence in which
the true state is always announced. Here, a unilateral deviation from truth-telling leads
to either one-period outcome according to self-selection when I = 2 or no change in the
outcome when I ≥ 3. Thus, in the latter case, deviating to always announcing the same
state may reduce complexity cost without affecting payoffs; in the former case, each player
faces the same incentive if the self-selection condition holds with equality.
In order to obtain our WPEC results on the basis of this alternative complexity mea-
sure, we therefore need to have equilibria where such a deviation generates a strict reduc-
tion in the continuation payoff. This would be possible if deviations from truth-telling
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induced a strict one-period punishment. With I = 2, this would be the case if the self-
selection condition held with strict inequalities.
With more than two players, suppose that there exists a “bad outcome” a˜ ∈ A such
that ui(a˜, θ) < ui(f((θ), θ) for all i and θ (e.g. zero consumption in a market; see Moore
and Repullo [32]). Then, we could alter R̂e above and obtain our WPECs implementation
results with Definition 8 by simply modifying the outcome function of its stage mechanism
as follows: whenever all agents announce the same state θ in Stage 1, f(θ) is implemented
while, otherwise, the bad outcome a˜ is implemented. Such a modification does not change
the decision problems regarding integers and hence all our characterization results remain
unaffected; the Markov strategy profile in which the true state and integer 0 are always
announced is a WPEC with Definition 8 because any deviation from truth-telling induces
the bad outcome.
If the agents are sufficiently patient, another way to obtain the same results with
Definition 8 is to modify the regime in a way that strict punishment for deviation from
truth-telling arises in the continuation game, rather than from one-shot incentives via
strict self-selection (in the range) or bad outcome. In the Supplementary Material (Section
2), we formally provide such a construction for the two-agent case.21
6 Relation to the Existing Literature
LS consider the same repeated implementation problem as this paper and show how to
repeatedly implement an SCF f satisfying efficiency in the range in Nash equilibrium,
using the following regime.22 In a given period, the agents simultaneously report a state
and a non-negative integer. The profile of state announcements determines the outcome
implemented in the current period, and the profile of integer announcements induces the
continuation regime as follows: (I) If every player announces zero, the same mechanism
is repeated next period; (II) if all but one agent, say i, announces zero integer, the
continuation regime Si is such that i obtains a payoff exactly equal to vi(f), his expected
payoff from the target SCF f ; and (III) in every other case the agent announcing the
highest integer becomes dictator forever thereafter. The last transition rule corresponds
21This is the same construction mentioned at the beginning of Section 3 for deriving the results there
without self-selection.
22Similar constructions are used by Lee and Sabourian [23] who consider repeated implementation with
incomplete information.
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to the so-called integer game arguments, and it ensures that there is no, pure or mixed,
equilibrium in which any player reports a positive integer on the outcome path. Given
this, the second part of transition offers each i an opportunity to pre-emptively deviate
should his continuation payoff fall below vi(f).
The constructions proposed in this paper have a similar structure in that the agents
are also asked to report two messages (albeit sequentially), where the former dictates
the current implementation and the latter the continuation play. In contrast to LS, the
support of the second message is finite, consisting of at most three numbers 0, 1 and 2.
With such a structure the integer arguments cannot be applied to exclude undesirable
equilibria. Hence, we replace transition rule (III) in LS by transitions to continuation
regimes described by {X(t)}∞t=1 and Y , while retaining the opportunities of pre-emptive
deviation that ensure at least the target payoff vi(f) for each player i. The continuation
regimes {X(t)}∞t=1 and Y are designed precisely to ensure that (a) every pure strategy
equilibrium entails announcements of 0, and (b) mixing occurs only between 1 and 2;
furthermore, any equilibrium mixing would involve non-stationary behavior that can be
replaced by a simpler strategy without any payoff consequence on- or off-path.
As in the constructions of LS, when there is an odd-one-out i reporting a non-zero
integer, our regimes activate Si in the next period. However, to achieve (a) and (b)
above, each continuation regime Si in our setup not only delivers payoff vi(f) to agent i
but also a payoff strictly worse than vj(f) to every other agent j. With two agents, there
is almost no additional loss of generality relative to LS in achieving this, since condition
φ in Lemma 2 would be true generically if f instead satisfied condition ω in LS. With
three or more agents, we invoke condition φ∗ (see Lemma 6).
The payoff structure of Si in this paper which keeps one agent’s payoff fixed at the
target level while lowering the payoffs of others strictly below their targets has a flavor of
the separability assumption invoked by Jackson, Palfrey and Srivastava [17] and Sjo¨stro¨m
[39] in one-shot implementation. Separability involves the following two elements: (i)
there exists some bad outcome a∗ ∈ A such that ui(a∗, θ) < ui(f(θ), θ) for any i and θ,
and (ii) for any a ∈ A, i and θ, there exists some a′ ∈ A such that ui(a′, θ) = ui(a, θ)
and uj(a
′, θ′) = uj(a∗, θ′) for all j 6= i and θ′. Separability is satisfied in economic
environments like an allocation problem without externalities, where zero consumption
vector would satisfy (i) and a consumption vector with only a single positive element
would correspond to (ii).
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The second part of separability shares some similarity to the payoff structure of Si
in our paper. However, note that we require Si to lower another agent j’s payoff below
vj(f), and not necessarily to a “worst” level, as stipulated by outcome a
∗ in the separable
case. Also, in our repeated setup, the ability to construct regime Si with such a payoff
structure is derived from condition φ for the case of I = 2, or from condition φ∗ when
I ≥ 3. The first part of conditions φ and φ∗ are in turn implied by part (i) of separability
(the former, for example, only assume an outcome whose expected payoff is less than the
target payoff for each agent). The second part of our conditions concerns the payoff that
a player derives from the SCF as compared to the case when another player is dictator.
Despite the above similarity, our objectives and arguments differ from those of Jackson,
Palfrey and Srivastava [17] and Sjo¨stro¨m [39]. In particular, our paper is concerned
with the problem of repeated implementation with randomly evolving preferences, and
we adopt a novel approach that invokes individuals’ bounded rationality to deal with
unwanted mixed strategy equilibria and enhance the scope of implementability beyond
LS. The objective of Jackson, Palfrey and Srivastava [17] and Sjo¨stro¨m [39] is to show
that in separable one-shot environments any social choice function can be implemented
in undominated Nash equilibrium with finite mechanisms.23 In their setup, this is done
for example by requiring each agent to report either a profile of states or outcomes (but
not both). Since the mechanism is such that each agent guarantees implementation of
a∗ from announcing outcomes it follows from part (i) of separability that announcing
outcomes is dominated by announcing states; the other part of separability is used to
make truth-telling the only undominated choice of state announcement.24
Could we exploit a similar separability argument to derive that announcing zero is the
only undominated strategy in our constructions? The difficulty in our setup is that our
arguments are applied to continuation payoffs; in particular, we do not know a priori the
continuation payoffs when the agents all announce zero. This is pinned down only after
the players’ equilibrium integer choices have been derived.
23Refinement arguments allow these authors to obtain their one-shot implementation results without
Maskin monotonicity. Other approaches in this direction include using dynamic mechanisms and subgame
perfection (e.g. Moore and Repullo [31]) and virtual implementation (e.g. Abreu and Matsushima [1]).
24In a recent paper, Mezzetti and Renou [28] identify sufficient conditions for mixed Nash implemen-
tation with finite mechanisms in separable environments. In their construction, “odd-one-out” leads to
deviating opportunities similar to ours but they assume that such opportunities can be constructed using
outcomes that are themselves desired social choices. See also Goltsman [14].
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Mezzetti and Renou [29] characterize the repeated Nash implementation setup of LS
in terms an alternative property that they call dynamic monotonicity. Their character-
ization applies to both infinitely and finitely repeated setups. The sufficiency results of
Mezzetti and Renou [29] also use mechanisms that involve unbounded integers and are
therefore open to the same criticisms against LS that the present paper addresses. In
this paper, we do not consider dynamically monotone SCFs and consider only infinitely
repeated implementation of efficient SCFs via bounded mechanisms. In the infinite setup
with sufficiently patient agents, there is not much of a loss in this approach as dynamic
monotonicity is generically equivalent to the notion of efficiency invoked by both LS and
the current paper.25 It may however be possible to extend the ideas and techniques de-
veloped in this paper to the case of finitely repeated, or even one-shot, implementation of
dynamically monotone social choices.
While a full investigation is beyond the scope of this paper, there are several issues
to note in this regard. On the one hand, some of our key arguments, in particular,
constructing {Si}i∈I , {X(t)}∞t=1 and Y , can be exactly replicated in any finite setup if the
planner can randomly choose mechanisms (see footnote 11). The main idea of complexity
definition, that stationary behavior is simpler than otherwise, can be applied to any
finitely repeated setup, as well as any (within-period) extensive form mechanisms. On the
other hand, repeatedly implementing a dynamically monotone SCFs via finite mechanisms
may not be so straightforward as the regimes proposed by Mezzetti and Renou [29] are
more complex than those used in LS.26 For instance, they ask players to report their
continuation payoffs in addition to states, outcomes and unbounded integers. Also, our
arguments cannot be directly applied to the one-shot environment since the ideas of
pre-emptive deviation to bound equilibrium payoffs and using complexity to eliminate
non-stationary behavior are based on multiple rounds of play.
Finally, our paper contributes to a growing body of papers that study the implica-
tions of individual bounded rationality for implementation in static environments. This
literature has so far introduced agents who make mistakes (Eliaz [10]), are partially hon-
est (Matsushima [27], Dutta and Sen [9]), choose best responses adaptively (Cabrales
and Serrano [4]) and have context-dependent preferences (Saran [37], de Clippel [7]),
among others. Complexity considerations in mechanism design have been analyzed in a
25Non-generically, the concepts are different depending on the precise details of conditions.
26Mezzetti and Renou [29] actually obtain their characterization by restricting attention to pure strate-
gies as well as allowing for random choice of mechanisms, in contrast to LS and this paper.
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principal-agent context by Glazer and Rubinstein [13]. Their model of bounded rational-
ity is different from ours, but interestingly, their results turn out to offer a broadly similar
message: faced with boundedly rational agent, complexity of the mechanism may actually
help the principal’s cause.
7 Conclusion
In summary, this paper explores how to repeatedly implement an efficient social choice
function when the agents have a preference for less complex strategies at the margin.
We identify some minor conditions under which such implementation is achieved with
using only finite mechanisms and allowing for mixed strategies. Compared with LS, when
faced with complexity-averse agents, the freedom to set different mechanisms at different
histories gives the planner an additional leverage to deter undesirable (mixing) behavior
even if the mechanisms themselves are simple. Another feature of our constructions is
that all mixed equilibria are strictly Pareto-dominated by pure equilibria which attain the
desired outcome paths.
The key feature in our regime constructions driving the WPEC results is the non-
stationarity of continuation regimes {X(t)}∞t=1, activated if two players announce the same
positive integer 1 or 2 at each period t. Although each mechanism in our regimes is simple
and does not employ integer games, one may suggest that the non-stationary sequence
of regimes poses another kind of implausible design. Our response is two-fold. First, the
criticism leveled at integer games is not about the implausibility of unboundedness per
se but rather about the fact that integer games kill off unwanted equilibria by strategies
that are themselves dominated. Our constructions achieve full implementation without
appealing to such arguments. Second, as specified in condition (3) above, our WPEC
results require X(t) to be distinct at just two dates. Thus, the degree of non-stationarity
or complexity in our regime constructions needs not be overly demanding.
Regarding the latter point, however, it is worth pointing out that greater non-stationarity
in {X(t)}∞t=1 also means more complex mixed strategy SPEs, and therefore, strengthens
the agents’ incentives to economize on complexity cost associated with such behavior. In
general, the planner could even write X(·) as a function of the entire (publicly observable)
history instead of just its date.
Another related issue that can be raised against our complexity analysis is why we
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consider a preference for less complexity only by the agents and not by the planner. We
note here that our complexity notion only calls for any additional complexity of a strategy
to be justified by payoffs. In a similar vein, for the planner the cost of implementing a
more complex regime could be warranted if it led to better implementation results.
Our notions of complexity apply to any regimes defined with extensive form mech-
anisms and therefore would be used to address the necessary conditions for repeated
implementation in WPEC or other related solution concepts. LS establish the following
result: if an SCF is repeatedly implementable via some regime but the SCF is strictly
Pareto-dominated by another SCF whose range belongs to that of the former, then the
regime admits another equilibrium that achieves the superior payoffs by triggering the
original equilibrium with lower payoffs upon any deviation. An interesting future research
question would be to see whether a similar argument can be extended to the notion of
WPEC.
A more broad lesson from our analysis is that complexity may help the planner’s
cause: by deliberately constructing a complex institution, the planner may guide the
agents to adopt desired strategies if they are simple while other equilibria involve complex
behavior. In our particular exploration, the agents are assumed to have preference for
less complex strategies at the margin, where complexity is concerned with the degree
of history-dependence of behavior. The complexity of regime that exploited these traits
was manifested in the non-stationarity of the sequence of mechanisms enforced. Indeed,
one can find many real world cases of complex institutions that have survived the test
of time (for an illuminating example, see the voting protocol for electing the Doge of
Venice between 1268 and 1797; Mowbray and Gollmann [33]).27 A potentially fruitful
direction for future research would be to uncover other relationships between complexity
and mechanism/institution design beyond the premises of this paper.
27The authors thank Romans Pancs for the example.
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A Appendix
A.1 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4
For each i = 1, 2, let Πi denote i’s continuation payoff at the next period if both agents
announce zero at the given history (h, d). Also, let zi denote the integer that i ends up
choosing at (h, d). At this history the players either randomize (over integers) or do not
randomize. We consider each case separately.
Case 1: No player randomizes.
In this case we show that each player must play 0 for sure. Suppose otherwise; then
some i plays zi 6= 0 for sure and the other announces zj for sure. We derive contradiction
by considering the following subcases.
Subcase 1A: zi > 0 and zj = 0.
The continuation regime at the next period is Si (Rule A.2). But then, since yj > w
i
j by
construction, j can profitably deviate by choosing a strategy identical to the equilibrium
strategy except that it announces the positive integer other than zi at this history, which
activates the continuation regime Y instead of Si (Rule A.3(iii)). This is a contradiction.
Subcase 1B: zi > 0 and zj > 0.
The continuation regime is either X, X(t) or Y (Rule A.3). Since y2 > x2(t) for any t,
it follows that if the continuation regime is X or X(t) then player 2 can profitably deviate
just as in Subcase 1A, a contradiction. Since x1 > y1, if the continuation regime is Y
player 1 can profitably deviate and we obtain a contradiction.
Thus, both players choose 0 for sure at this history, and ge must be the mechanism
at the next period. We next show that Πi = vi(f) for all i. For this, suppose first
that Πi < vi(f) for some i. But then, by Rule A.2, i could deviate at this history
(h, d) by announcing a positive integer and obtain a continuation payoff equal to vi(f), a
contradiction. It therefore follows that Πi ≥ vi(f) for all i. Then, suppose that Πi > vi(f)
for some i. But, since regime Re only employs outcomes from the set f(Θ), and since
f is efficient in the range, it must be that Πj < vj(f) for j 6= i. This contradicts that
Πi ≥ vi(f) for all i.
Case 2: Some player randomizes.
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We proceed by first establishing the following two claims.
Claim 1 : For each i, the continuation payoff from announcing 1 is greater than that
from announcing 0, if zj > 0 for sure, j 6= i.
Proof of Claim 1. If i announces zero, by Rule A.2, his continuation payoff is wji . If he
announces 1, by Rules A.3(i) and A.3(iii), the continuation payoff is xi > w
j
i or yi > w
j
i .
Claim 2 : Suppose that agent i announces 0 with positive probability. Then the other
agent j must also announce 0 with positive probability and Πi ≥ vi(f). Furthermore,
Πi > vi(f) if j does not choose 0 for sure.
Proof of Claim 2. By Claim 1, playing 1 must always yield a higher continuation
payoff for player i than playing 0, except when j plays 0. Since i plays 0 with positive
probability, it must then be that j also chooses 0 with positive probability. Hence, we
obtain that Πi ≥ vi(f) with the inequality being strict if j plays a positive integer with
positive probability.
We now show that, in this Case 2, both players choose a positive integer for sure. To
show this suppose otherwise; then some player chooses 0 with positive probability. By
Claim 2, the other player must also play 0 with positive probability and, also, Πi ≥ vi(f)
for any i = 1, 2. Moreover, since this case assumes that some player is choosing 0 with
probability less than one, by appealing to Claim 2 once again, it must be that at least one
of the inequalities Π1 ≥ v1(f) or Π2 ≥ v2(f) is strict. Note also that regime Re involves
only outcomes in the range of f . Therefore, since f is efficient in the range, we have a
contradiction.
In this case, therefore, both players mix between 1 and 2 for sure and, by simple com-
putation, it must be that each i plays 1 with probability xi(t)−yi
xi+xi(t)−2yi ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore,
since for each i, vi(f) exceeds xi, xi(t) or y, it follows that the continuation payoff at the
next period must be less than vi(f).
Proof of Proposition 1
Given Lemma 4, it suffices to show that any mixing over integers in equilibrium must
occur in period 1. Suppose not; so, there exists an SPE σ such that, for some t > 1, there
exist ht ∈ Ht and d ∈ D2 that occur on the equilibrium path at which the players are
mixing over integers.
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First, note that by Lemma 4 the players must have all announced 0 for sure in the
previous period and, moreover, pih
t
i (σ,R
e) = vi(f) for all i = 1, 2. Second, for any d
′ ∈ D2,
we can apply similar reasoning to show that pi
ht,d′,z˜i (σ,Re) = vi(f) for all i if z˜ = (0, 0)
and (ht, d′, z˜) occurs on the equilibrium path.
Next, let r(d′, z˜) denote the probability of (d′, z˜) ∈ D2 × Z2 occurring at ht under
σ, and let ah
t,d′ denote the outcome implemented at (ht, d′). Then, with slight abuse of
notation, i’s continuation payoff at ht can be written as
pih
t
i (σ,R
e) =
∑
(d′,z˜)∈D2×Z2
r(d′, z˜)
[
(1− δ)ui(aht,d′ , d′) + δpi
ht,d′,z˜i (σ,Re)] = vi(f). (8)
Lemma 4 implies that, for any i and any d′, it must be either that z˜ = (0, 0) and
hence, by the argument above, pi
ht,d′,z˜i = vi(f), or that both players announce a positive
integer and hence pi
ht,d′,z˜i < vi(f) for all i. Thus, since we assume that mixing over positive
integers occurs after d, it follows from (8) that
∑
(d′,z˜) r(d′, z˜)ui(aht,d′ , d′) > vi(f) for all i.But this contradicts that f is efficient in the range.
Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose not. Then, by Lemma 4, there exists a WPEC, σ, such that, at some t, ht ∈ Ht
and d ∈ D2, the two agents play integer 1 or 2 for sure and each i plays 1 with probability
xi(t)−yi
xi+xi(t)−2yi . Furthermore, by construction, there exist t
′ and t′′ such that x(t′) 6= x(t′′)
and, therefore, it follows that, for all i, we have either σi(h
t, d) 6= σi(ht′ , d) for some
ht
′ ∈ Ht′ , or σi(ht, d) 6= σi(ht′′ , d) for some ht′′ ∈ Ht′′ .
Now, consider any i = 1, 2 deviating to another strategy σ′i that is identical to the
equilibrium strategy σi except that, for all h ∈ H∞, σ′i(h, d) prescribes announcing 1 with
probability 1. Since σ′i is less complex than σi, we obtain a contradiction by showing that
pihi (σ
′
i, σ−i, R
e) = pihi (σ,R
e) for all h ∈ H∞. To do so, fix any history h and suppose that
the given partial history d occurs after h. Given Lemma 4, there are two cases to consider
at (h, d).
First, suppose that j plays 0 for sure. Then, by part (a) of Lemma 4, i also plays 0 for
sure and obtains a continuation payoff equal to vi(f) in equilibrium. By Rule B.2 of the
regime, the deviation also induces the same continuation payoff vi(f). Second, suppose
that j is mixing. Then, by part (b) of Lemma 4, j mixes between 1 and 2 and i is also
indifferent between choosing 1 and 2.
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Proofs of Proposition 2 and Theorem 2
These results are proved by the next three lemmas.
Lemma 7 Regime R̂e admits an SPE, σ∗, in Markov strategies such that, for any t,
h ∈ Ht and θ ∈ Θ, (i) gh(σ∗, Re) = ge and (ii) Ah,θ(σ∗, Re) = {f(θ)}.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.
Lemma 8 Consider any SPE of regime R̂e. Fix any t, h ∈ Ht and d ∈ D2. Then, one
of the following must hold at (h, d):
(a) Each i ∈ I announces 0 for sure and his continuation payoff at the next period is
equal to vi(f).
(b) Each i ∈ {k, l} announces 1 or 2 for sure, with the probability of choosing 1 equal to
xi(t)−yi
xi+xi(t)−2yi ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, for all j ∈ I, the continuation payoff at the next
period is less than vj(f).
Proof. For each i, let Πi denote i’s continuation payoff at the next period if all agents
announce zero at the fixed history (h, d) ∈ Ht ×D2. Also, let zi denote the integer that
i ends up choosing at (h, d). At this history the players either randomize (over integers)
or do not randomize. We shall prove the claim by considering each case separately.
Case 1: No player randomizes.
In this case, we show that, each player must play 0 for sure. Suppose otherwise;
then some i plays zi 6= 0 for sure. We derive contradiction by considering the following
subcases.
Subcase 1A: zk > 0 and zl = 0, or zk = 0 and zl > 0.
Consider the former case; the latter case can be handled analogously. The continuation
regime at the next period is Sk (Rule B.2). But then, since yl > w
k
l by (4), l can
profitably deviate by choosing a strategy identical to the equilibrium strategy except
that it announces the positive integer other than zl at this history, which activates the
continuation regime Y instead of Sk (Rule B.3(iii)). This is a contradiction.
Subcase 1B: zk > 0 and zl > 0.
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The continuation regime is either X,X(t) or Y (Rule B.3). Suppose that it is X or
X(t). By (4), we have yl > xl(t
′) for all t′. But then, l can profitably deviate by choosing a
strategy identical to the equilibrium strategy except that it announces the positive integer
other than zl at this history, which activates Y (Rule B.3(iii)). This is a contradiction.
Similarly, since xk > yk by (4), when the continuation regime is Y , player k can profitably
deviate and we obtain a similar contradiction.
Subcase 1C: For some C ⊆ I\{k, l}, zi = 1 for all i ∈ C and zi = 0 for all i /∈ C.
The continuation regime is SC (Rule B.4). By (6), we have wjj > w
C
j for j ∈ {k, l}.
But then, j can profitably deviate by choosing a strategy identical to the equilibrium
strategy except that it announces a positive integer at this history, which activates Sj
(Rule B.2).
Thus, all players choose 0 for sure at this history, and gˆe must be the mechanism at
the next period. We next show that Πi = vi(f) for all i. Suppose not. First, suppose
that Πi < vi(f) for some i. But then, i could deviate at this history (h, d) by announcing
a positive integer and obtain a continuation payoff equal to vi(f), a contradiction. It
therefore follows that Πi ≥ vi(f) for all i. In the continuation game, we either have
implementation of outcomes in the range of f or end up activating continuation regimes
from {Si}Ii=1 ∪{X(t)}∞t=1 ∪Y whose payoffs are all Pareto-dominated by v(f). Therefore,
if f is efficient in the range Πi = vi(f) for all i.
Case 2: Some player randomizes.
We proceed by establishing the following claims.
Claim 1 : For each agent k or l, the continuation payoff (at the next period) from
announcing 1 is greater than that from announcing 0, if there exists another player an-
nouncing a positive integer.
Proof of Claim 1. Consider k and any z˜−k 6= (0, . . . , 0). The other case for l can be
proved identically. There are two possibilities:
First, suppose that zl > 0. In this case, if k announces zero, by Rule B.2, his con-
tinuation payoff is wlk. If he announces 1, by Rules B.3(i) and B.3(iii), the continuation
payoff is xk or yk. But, by (4), we have xk > yk > w
l
k.
Second, suppose that zl = 0. In this case, since z˜−k 6= (0, . . . , 0), there must exist a
non-empty set C ⊆ I\{k, l} such that zi = 1 for all i ∈ C and zi = 0 for all i ∈ I\{C∪k}.
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Then if k announces 0, by Rule B.4, his continuation payoff is wCk , whereas if he announces
1, by Rule B.2, the continuation payoff is wkk . But, by (6), we have w
k
k > w
C
k .
Claim 2 : If agent k or l announces zero with positive probability, then every other
agent must also announce zero with positive probability.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose not. Then, suppose that k plays 0 with positive probability
but some i 6= k chooses 0 with zero probability. (The other case for l can be proved
identically.) But then, by Claim 1, the latter implies that k obtains a lower continuation
payoff from choosing 0 than from choosing 1. This contradicts the supposition that k
chooses 0 with positive probability.
Claim 3. Suppose that some agent i ∈ {k, l} announces 0 with positive probability.
Then, Πi ≥ vi(f) with this inequality being strict if some other agent announces a positive
integer with positive probability.
Proof of Claim 3. For any agent i ∈ {k, l}, by Claim 1, playing 1 must always yield a
higher continuation payoff i than playing 0, except when all other agents play 0. Since i
plays 0 with positive probability, the following must hold:
(i) If all others announce 0, i’s continuation payoff when he announces 0 must be no
less than that he obtains when he announces 1, i.e. Πi ≥ vi(f).
(ii) If some other player attaches a positive weight to a positive integer, i’s continuation
payoff must be greater when he chooses 0 than when he chooses 1 in the case in which all
others choose 0, i.e. Πi > vi(f).
Claim 4 : For each agent i ∈ I\{k, l}, the continuation payoff from announcing zero
is no greater than that from announcing 1, if there exists another player announcing a
positive integer.
Proof of Claim 4. For each i ∈ I\{k, l}, the continuation payoff is independent of his
choice if zk > 0 or zl > 0. So, suppose that zk = zl = 0. Then if i chooses 1 he obtains
wCi , for some C ∈ I\{k, l} such that i /∈ C, while he obtains wC∪{i}i from choosing 1. By
(7), wCi ≤ wC∪{i}i . Thus, the claim follows.
Claim 5. For each agent i ∈ I\{k, l}, Πi ≥ vi(f) if all players announce 0 with positive
probability.
Proof of Claim 5. Note that, if zj = 0 for all j 6= i, i obtains Πi from choosing 0
and obtains vi(f) from choosing 1. Since, by assumption, i announces 0 with positive
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probability, announcing 0 must be weakly preferred to either positive integer. The claim
then follows immediately from the previous claim.
Claim 6. Both k and l choose a positive integer for sure.
Proof of Claim 6. Suppose otherwise; then some i ∈ {k, l} chooses 0 with positive
probability. Then, by Claim 2, every other agent must play 0 with positive probability.
By Claims 3 and 5, this implies that Πj ≥ vj(f) for every j. Moreover, since in this
case there is randomization, some player must be choosing a positive integer with positive
probability. Then, by appealing to Claim 3 once again, we must also have that at least
one of the inequalities Πk ≥ vk(f) or Πl ≥ vl(f) is strict. Since f is efficient in the range,
this is a contradiction.
Claim 7. Both k and l choose each of the integers 1 and 2 with positive probability.
Proof of Claim 7. Suppose not; then by the previous claim one of either k or l must
choose one of the positive integers for sure. But then, (4) implies that the other must also
do the same. But, by applying (4) once again, this induces a contradiction (the argument
is exactly the same as in Subcase 1B of Case 1 with no randomization).
Given the last two claims, simple computation verifies that both agents k and l must
be playing 1 with unique probability as in the statement. The continuation payoffs, for
each i ∈ I, when k or l chooses a positive integer are xi, xi(t) or y. Moreover, by (4), each
of these payoffs is less than vi(f). Therefore, it follows that, in this case, the continuation
payoff at the next period must be less than vi(f) for all i.
Lemma 9 Fix any WPEC of regime R̂e. Also, fix any t, h ∈ Ht and d ∈ D2. Then,
every agent announces zero for sure at this history.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, by Lemma 8 above, there exists a WPEC, σ, such that, at
some t, ht ∈ Ht and d ∈ D2, each i ∈ {k, l} plays integer 1 or 2 for sure and integer 1
is chosen with probability xi(t)−yi
xi+xi(t)−2yi . Furthermore, by construction, there exist t
′ and t′′
such that xk(t
′) 6= xk(t′′) and xl(t′) 6= xl(t′′). Thus, it follows that, for each i ∈ {k, l},
we have either σi(h
t, d) 6= σi(ht′ , d) for some ht′ ∈ Ht′ , or σi(ht, d) 6= σi(ht′′ , d) for some
ht
′′ ∈ Ht′′ .
Now, consider any i ∈ {k, l} deviating to another strategy σ′i that is identical to the
equilibrium strategy σi except that, for all h ∈ H∞, σ′i(h, d) prescribes announcing 1
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for sure. Since σ′i is less complex than σi, we obtain a contradiction by showing that
pihi (σ
′
i, σ−i, R
e) = pihi (σ,R
e) for all h ∈ H∞. To this end, fix any history h and suppose
that the given partial history d occurs at h. Given Lemma 8, there are two cases to
consider at (h, d).
First, suppose that every agent plays 0 for sure. Then, by part (a) of Lemma 8, i
also plays 0 for sure and obtains a continuation payoff equal to vi(f) in equilibrium. By
Rule B.2 of the regime, the deviation also induces the same continuation payoff vi(f).
Otherwise, by part (b) of Lemma 8, agents k and l mix between 1 and 2; thus, i is
indifferent.
A.2 PEC and Period 1
Lemma 10 Every PEC, σ, of regime Re is Markov: for all i ∈ I, σi(h′, d) = σi(h′′, d)
for all h′,h′′ ∈ H∞ and all d ∈ D.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists some PEC, σ, such that σi(h
′, d) 6= σi(h′′, d′) for
some i,h′,h′′ and d′. By Lemma 5, we know that d′ ∈ D1; let d′ = θ.
Consider i deviating to another strategy σ′i that is identical to σi except that, irre-
spective of past history, (i) whenever d = θ, it does what the equilibrium strategy does
in period 1 after the given partial history, and (ii) whenever d = (θ, θ˜) for any θ˜ ∈ Θ2,
i.e. any Stage 2 partial history following realization of the given state θ˜, it announces 1.
Formally, for all h ∈ H∞ and θ˜ ∈ Θ2, σ′i(h, θ˜) = σi(∅, θ) and σ′i(h, θ, θ˜) = 1 (where the
latter slightly abuses notation to denote a pure strategy).
Clearly, σ′i is less complex than σi. Furthermore, the deviation alters neither i’s one-
period payoff in period 1 at θ˜ nor, by Rule A.2 of the regime, and since the opponent
player’s equilibrium strategy announces 0, his continuation payoff as of period 2 on the
equilibrium path. This contradicts the assumption of PEC.
Together with Theorem 1, this lemma immediately implies the following.
Theorem 3 Suppose that I = 2 and δ ∈ (3
4
, 1
)
. If an SCF f is efficient in the range,
and satisfies self-selection in the range and condition φ, there exists a regime R such that
(i) a PEC exists and (ii) every PEC σ satisfies pih
t
i (σ,R) = vi(f) for any i ∈ I, t ≥ 1 and
h ∈ Ht(σ,R).
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